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Abstract 
 
What does governance mean for the World Bank and to what extent does the 
organization succeed in diffusing the paradigm worldwide? The World Bank primarily 
focused on economic aspects of governance in the 1980s, and progressively moved to its 
political dimensions towards the end of 1990s. The paper discusses the reasons for this 
global shift and its consistency with regard to the values of the liberal society. 
Bibliometric methods are used to evaluate the role of the Bank as a producer of 
knowledge on this specific issue. The potential influence of the World Bank’s main 
governance indicators: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) and Doing Business, is depicted through what donors claim 
when allocating aid, and beyond rhetoric, through what correlations suggest. For each of 
the main international donors, cross-sectional econometric regressions are run on large 
samples of developing countries (2005-2008). Depending on the donor we look at, 
empirical results do not reject strong covariations between new aid commitments and 
the CPIA, and to a lesser extent with the WGI.     
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Many social sciences refer to good governance practices. Political scientists define the subject 
through the analysis of the relations between rulers and ruled, the functioning of political 
regimes, and the way institutions work. Economists focus on the quality of resource 
allocation, and the best way to provide the largest utility within the community. In the liberal 
contract, political and economic values combine in a normative situation, in which the 
maximum individual freedom goes along with the market as the main institution for resource 
allocation within the economy. An extensive literature already exists on the problem about the 
concept or the practical problems arising with the measurement of governance indicators1. 
Our intention in this paper is to shed some light on how the World Bank (WB or the Bank) 
has shaped this concept over a twenty year period since the end of the 1970s when the issue 
rose to the forefront of the development agenda. At that time, the Bank referred to this 
phenomenon to explain major economic failures in the public management of the poorest 
countries2 (World Bank, 1989). The organization progressively moved to the political 
dimension, and beyond the welfare State economy that inspired the first decades of its 
functioning3. Both the fall of the Berlin wall, and the end of the ideological competition 
contributed to shape liberal governance4.  
 The next section of the paper outlines the genesis of ideas on governance within the Bank. 
The organization proved sensitive to the external thinking of academics, and contributed itself 
to defining the paradigm of good governance over nearly three decades. Section 3 focuses on 
the relationship between the ‘Knowledge Bank’ and the governance issue. We quantify the 
“soft power” of the Bank by the relative importance of this theme in its intellectual 
production. Section 4 focuses on the WB’s aid allocation system which combines both soft 
and hard power principles.5 The WB’s main governance indicators: the Country Policy and 
                                                 
1
 See Arndt and Oman, 2006; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008; Williams and Siddique, 2008; Langbein 
and Knack, 2010; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2010. 
2
 See: Stein, 2008; Shihata, 1995; Williams and Young, 1994; Stone and Wright, 2007; Tshuma, 1999, 
Brautigam, 1991. 
3
 See Joseph, 2000; Miller-Adams, 1999; Owusu, 2003; Pender, 2001; Shihata, 1995 ; Harrison, 2005; 
Devesh et al, 1997. 
4
 Fukuyama (1992) was among the most prominent authors to predict the global triumph of political 
and economic liberalism adopting the Hegelian perspective of a progressive humanity evolving to a 
universal ideology.  
5According to Nye (1990), leadership is not just a question of issuing commands through inducements 
or threats; soft power also matters. “Soft” power is characterized by the ability to shape the 
preferences of others through persuasion, or attraction that leads to acquiescence.  Conditionality 
principles proceed from a hard power while the diffusion of the Bank’s paradigm in the member state 
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Institutional Assessment (CPIA), the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and the 
Doing Business indicators (DB) are briefly analysed, as well as the importance that the donor 
community assigns to each of them in allocating funds. Beyond what donors claim, we also 
explore how actual financial commitments correlate with these indicators, controlling for 
some structural determinants of aid allocation. For each donor, cross-sectional regressions run 
on developing countries over a four year average period (2005-08) do not reject the presence 
of linear correlations. For some donors the CPIA seems to be the most important, especially 
for regional multilateral banks; while bilateral donors such as France and to a lesser extent the 
United Kingdom demonstrate a “path dependency” with an allocation rule determined by their 
own past colonial history.  The CPIA proves influential, while both the WGI and the 
information conveyed by the Doing Business matter less. Section 5 provides conclusions.  
 
 
THE BANK AND THE GOVERNANCE PARADIGM  OVER TIME 
 
The Landell-Mills coordinated 1989 report: Sub-Saharan Africa, from Crisis to sustainable 
Growth (World Bank, 1989) has generally been considered as the first official WB 
publication which refers explicitly to the “governance” issue (Williams and Young, 1994; 
Shihata, 1995; Stein, 2008). This does not mean that the theme was ignored before.  At the 
beginning of the 1980s, the so-called Berg report explained the low economic growth rates in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and called attention to the responsibility of non-Weberian African public 
bureaucracies (World Bank, 1981). Governance was not explicitly designated as a crucial 
problem, but the poor management underlying public sector weaknesses was denounced as a 
major hindrance to the development process6.  
  Redefining state interventions and market mechanisms was the challenge of the neo-liberal 
wave,7 getting the prices right became the credo of structural adjustment programs. Within 
the Bank the liberal option took a decisive turn in 1981 with the appointments of Claussen 
and Krueger, respectively as the President and the Chief Economist of the organization, 
succeeding the charismatic tandem of MacNamara and Chenery. Under the influence of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
community relates to a soft power. On this point, see: Mosley et al., 1995; Van Waeyenberge, 2009; 
Storey, 2000; Plehwe, 2007. 
6
 From the beginning of the 1950’s to the end of the 1970’s, the welfare state principles prevailed and 
the Bank supported public interventionism in developing countries to bypass inefficient market 
mechanisms. Governments were encouraged to take the lead in the development process.   
7
 See Cling and Roubaud, 2008; Mawdsley and Rigg, 2003; Stein, 2008; Stiglitz, 1999; Kapur et al, 
1997. 
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Reagan administration, the Bank was exhorted to use its financial leverage, to support the free 
market perspective (Williams and Young, 1994), and to promote the worldwide neo-liberal 
order, complying with the rules of the “Washington consensus”. Progressively, the conception 
of “good governance” becomes to be associated with the “free market” economy, the 
Victorian virtues of free markets and sound money, as the key of economic development. All 
the chief economists from A. Krueger (1982-86) to M. Bruno (1993-96) belong to this school 
of thought with its institutional, political and social extensions defining the so-called 
“augmented Washington consensus”8. 
 In 1992, Governance and development brings further information on what governance 
means for the Bank, highlighting both the course of history and the institutional constraints 
inhibiting the evolution of the concept within the organization9. On the one hand, the 
introduction of the pamphlet refers to a general definition of governance which can be seen as 
the exercise of authority, control, management and power of government. On the other hand, 
a pragmatic definition drives the Bank to interpret governance as the manner in which power 
is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development. 
The concern is that good governance is to be seen as synonymous with sound development, 
thus extending beyond public sector management to the principles of accountability, and the 
legal framework. While the Bank seems to reject the political dimension, the booklet suggests 
that there is no taboo anymore on the subject (World Bank, 1992, 1994).  As the Berlin Wall 
has fallen, but the Soviet empire has not collapsed, the organization remains cautious on 
ideology, and what can be interpreted as an assessment of political regimes.  A lot of World 
                                                 
8
 The concept of Washington Consensus was developed for the first time in Williamson (1990), Latin 
American Adjustment: How Much Has It Happened? Washington, D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics. See Onis and Senses (2005) and  Rodrik (2006) for more details. The original Washington 
Consensus was based on: 1. Fiscal discipline; 2. Reorientation of public expenditures; 3. Tax reform; 
4. Financial liberalization; 5. Unified and competitive exchange rates;  6. Trade liberalization;  7. 
Openness to DFI;  8. Privatization;  9. Deregulation;  10. Secure Property Rights.  The “Augmented” 
Washington Consensus enlarges the previous items with: 11. Corporate governance; 12. Anti-
corruption; 13. Flexible labour markets;, 14. WTO agreements;  15. Financial codes and standards; 16. 
“Prudent” capital-account opening; 17. Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes; 18. Independent 
central banks/inflation targeting; 19. Social safety nets; 20. Targeted poverty reduction. 
9
 The 1992 pamphlet refers to a definition of the governance given by the Webster's New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary (London: Dorset & Baber, 1979). Governance has three distinct aspects: (a) 
the form of political regime (parliamentary or presidential, military or civilian, and authoritarian or 
democratic); (b) the processes by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's 
economic and social resources; and (c) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and 
implement policies, and, in general, to discharge government functions. The first aspect clearly falls 
outside the Bank's mandate. The Bank's focus is, therefore, on the second and third aspects. (See: 
World Bank, 1992; 1994; 2001a; 2001b). 
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Bank member countries do not really comply with the conditions of western democracy. Free 
political competition only exists in few developing countries, and then the realpolitik 
principle has to apply. In addition, formal democracy is not enough. Pluralism needs the 
promotion of the rule of law, as well as the participatory process of civil society performing 
“watchdog” functions. At that time the Bank avoids any dangerous correlation of good 
governance with the main features of the western neo-liberal political system. The first 
infringement to this “neutrality” came with J. Wolfensohn, when in 1996 the agenda for 
anticorruption was launched. At the joint World Bank-IMF annual meeting, the head of the 
Bank talks about the need to fight the “cancer of corruption”. One year later the same words 
come up in “Helping Countries Combat Corruption”, and in the World Development Report 
which addresses the problem of the State in a changing world. In the foreword of this report, 
Wolfensohn made the point that an effective State works for the market, not as a director. In 
addition, he stresses the role of the civil society, which was already perceived by Tocqueville 
as “the ultimate guarantee that the state will be unable to arrogate to itself any more power 
than an active citizenry is willing to grant” (World Bank, 1997). 
 The “good” governance concept, initially limited to public management reforms and later 
to the building of the free market economy, then becomes a more complex phenomenon with 
the introduction of political values. Democracy is the reference with the presence of “checks 
and balances”, including those associated with the participatory process of the civil society. 
We will return later to the indicators operationalizing these views, but in 1999 this political 
dimension was taken into account to revisit the definition of the Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which was the first World Bank governance indicator 
created at the end of 1970s. The main outcome of this revision was to incorporate some items 
relating to property rights and rule-based governance, as well as to transparency and 
corruption in the public sector. For a long time, the CPIA had been a pure intra-organizational 
instrument for the Bank’s internal country evaluations. Together, the transparency rules and 
the accountability principles, that are required from member countries, as well as the will to 
measure the political distance to democracy or the stimulation of the social participatory 
process, help the progressive diffusion of information externally. In addition to the CPIA 
revision and its diffusion within the world community, in 1999 the Bank also launched the 
calculation of the Worldwide Governance Indicators whose construction and international 
cover have deeply evolved over the last ten years10.   
                                                 
10
 See Kaufmann et al, 2008.  
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 In parallel to this indicator, to which we return later, in 1998 the Comprehensive 
Development Framework (CDF) was created, encompassing a set of principles to guide 
poverty reduction, including a holistic long-term vision of development. This initiative was 
taken while the weaknesses of the “Washington Consensus” were being criticized; standard 
policy reforms having failed to produce expected outcomes in terms of economic growth and 
poverty reduction. A second generation of reforms was needed, the so-called “augmented 
Washington Consensus”, which is heavily institutional in nature (see, Rodrik, 2006). 
Economic programmes have to extend to governance, anti-corruption, legal and 
administrative reforms, labour market flexibility and social safety nets. Within the Bank, 
Stiglitz, who is appointed as the new Chief Economist in February 1997, supports this 
refashioning, encouraging a movement beyond liberalization and privatization, and reminding 
us that the market does not always provide the most efficient outcome. The CDF emphasizes 
the need to create the institutional underpinnings of market economies, and to tackle poverty 
as a primary ambition.  
 Using the CDF principles, a country defines its vision of the development process in close 
collaboration with all domestic and external stakeholders (civil society, private sector, 
donors). The CDF inspired the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) and helped to shape the 
United Nations declaration (2000) concerning the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
as well as the Monterrey consensus, which committed developing countries to set up “good” 
governance. Strictly speaking, poverty reduction is not a new objective, being a major 
element of the original charter of the Bank. But what is new is that beyond the “trickle down” 
theory that urged governments to concentrate on maximizing GDP growth rate, the poverty 
reduction strategy now conflicts with post Second World War redistributions based on 
reduction of income inequalities. The economy is seen as efficient when achieving the 
maximum output of preferred goods and services from available resources. But this 
dimension, reflecting the economic governance, is not enough. Income distribution associated 
with output is also important. It must be seen to be “just” or “fair”; the problem being to 
specify what this distribution should be. This is not an issue where economists are very 
influential. The definition of distributional efficiency belongs more to the realm of moral and 
political philosophy. However, at the turn of the century, the concept of a liberal distributional 
efficiency prevails in the world community and deeply influences the Bank. The 2006 World 
Development Report illustrates this new philosophy and finalizes what must be considered as 
“good governance” from the liberal standpoint.  
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 Public action should focus on the distribution of assets, economic opportunities, and 
political voice, rather than directly on inequality of incomes. Greater equity implies more 
efficient economic functioning, reduced conflict, greater trust, and better institutions, with 
dynamic benefits for investment and growth. When these rules apply in a market economy, 
income differences then provide incentives to invest in education and physical capital, to 
work, and to take risks. Income inequalities are consubstantial to the efficiency of the market 
economy, and prove inacceptable only if there are predetermined circumstances out of 
individual control. “Equal opportunity” may be considered to be the basic principle 
underlying the promotion of equity, and this means the possibility for individuals to benefit 
from the same abilities, to pursue a life of their choosing, and to be spared from extreme 
deprivation in outcomes. With the strategic orientations of its 2006 World Development 
report, the Bank has completed its liberal interpretation of governance beyond the Western 
spirit of welfare state economics.  Its philosophy integrates Sen’s line of thought, but is also 
impregnated with Rawls’s liberal political philosophy based on fairness in the distribution of 
“natural” and “social primary goods”. It also takes into account Dworkin’s vision of the unity 
of political and economic liberalism through its conception of equality (e.g. luck, 
egalitarianism).  Accordingly, the Bank has drawn the lessons of the 1980s when it was urged 
to promote adjustment processes with a “human face” and criticized for its excessive concern 
for relative prices.   
 After maturing for several decades, the World Bank’s “good governance” finally looks like 
something quite close to what the philosophers of the enlightenment had in mind: a paradigm 
embracing political, economic and social aspects that make the equilibrium of an efficient 
liberal society. However, the question of whether the paradigm must be considered as a 
universal one or not, is still being debated. Fukuyama (1992) defended this perspective in The 
End of History and the Last Man predicting that human rights, liberal democracy and the 
capitalist free market economy together were to become the unique ideological term of 
reference. Conflicting with this perspective, Huntington (1993) announced cultural divisions 
and the evolution to a Clash of Civilizations. Many economists also qualify Fukuyama’s 
views, at least as regards the values and the channels leading to development.  Stiglitz as well 
as Rodrik (2006) reject the hypothesis of an exhaustion of all institutional variations that 
could “underpin healthy and vibrant economies”. In a world combining global governance 
and multipolar power, the “good governance” issue will remain challenging. As a pragmatic 
organization, the Bank remains open to ideas outside the conventional paradigm. The role of 
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the State and public organizations in the design of development strategy illustrates this 
behavior. Indeed, this role is much more balanced than it was thirty years ago.  
 
 
THE  KNOWLEDGE BANK AND THE GOVERNANCE ISSUE 
 
The development of the organization as a “Knowledge Bank” was one of the major objectives 
of Wolfensohn’s Presidency. This new vision was the combination of the President’s 
corporate pragmatism and Stiglitz’s own academic influence on the emergence of information 
economics. At the end of the 1990’s the  organization was more than ever focused on a 
triptych consisting in creating and sharing  knowledge for applying “best practices” in 
member states (Squire, 1999; Mehta, 2001; Krueger, 1998; Das, 2009; McNeill, 2006; 
Plehwe, 2007 ; Stiglitz, 1999). If knowledge production and its diffusion are mainly the 
concern of the Research Department (DEC), especially through the activity of the 
Development Research Group and the World Development Report Unit, additional structures 
also contribute on the governance issue 11. The Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management network (PREM) is engaged in the production of the CPIA. This structure 
operates in close cooperation with the World Bank Institute (WBI), which is in charge of the 
WGI and the country-governance profiles, the so-called diagnostic surveys of Governance 
and Anti-Corruption (GAC). Last but not least, the recent Deaton report on Bank research 
evaluation has brought attention to the Private Sector Development Group (Banerjee et al, 
2006). Based at the International Finance Corporation (IFC), this group is a significant 
contributor to the governance theme through both the Doing Business and the Investment 
Climate Assessment projects.   
 One way to assess the Bank’s influence is to perform a bibliometric analysis.  This exercise 
has been carried out, using the Web of Science bibliographic database from the ISI Web of 
Knowledge website (Institute for Scientific Information -ISI) published by Thomson Reuters. 
We evaluate the role governance played within the organization but also the Bank’s share in 
the worldwide production of knowledge on this specific issue. Governance-based publications 
                                                 
11
 For Gilbert et al (1999), the DEC is the most important centre for development economics 
worldwide, with some influential implications on academia that are noted by S. Fisher (1995). While 
recognizing this impact and the ability to promote development schemes, some authors such as Gavin 
and Rodrik (1995) or Stern and Ferreira (1997) qualify these views, asserting that no major economic 
idea had ever resulted from in-house production. 
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in the most influential journals are considered, as well as associated citations in the academic 
literature. This combined information provides an insight on the relative importance of the 
Bank on the governance issue.  
 To undertake the census of publications we retain the presence of “governance” as a term 
either in the title, the abstract or the list of keywords. A paper is ascribed to the Bank if the 
name of the organization appears as one affiliation of its authors. Materials collected are 
classified according to the subject area, the document type and the year of publication. 
Publications are defined by 4 items: article, review, proceedings, book review. Three large 
scientific fields have been considered, from 200 listed by the Web of Science database: 
Economics, planning and development; Business and finance; Political science and 
international relations. These fields fit the main intervention areas of the Bank, where 
governance proves a relevant topic for characterizing the economic and political rules of 
societies. Additional domains did not modify the conclusions we draw. They partially overlap 
with the three chosen ones, which represent one third of all publications from all scientific 
disciplines, including company management or environmental studies, 12 where governance is 
a topic. The investigation covers the period 1988-200813. The starting year corresponds with 
the emergence of the concept in the economics literature.  
 Figure 1 describes both the annual evolution of the worldwide scientific production on 
governance (left ordinate axis and light color stair form representation), and the specific 
contribution of the Bank to this production (right ordinate axis). The worldwide publications 
on this issue have increased in a quasi-permanent way since the early nineties. Accelerating at 
the end of the empirical period when 800 publications a year are recorded against ten at the 
beginning of the 1990s.  Within this production, the Bank’s share has varied from less than 
1% to more than 3%. This share decreased as the world scientific community displayed a 
greater interest for the topic, while the pioneering role of the Bank reduced. The peak of the 
share is achieved in the period 1999-2000, when the organization showed renewed interest for 
the analysis of the governance issue, especially through the CDF program and the launch of 
the project on the WGIs. After this period, the Bank’s relative contribution declined to 
represent only 1.5% in 2008.  
                                                 
12
 The problem with the subject classification is that some publications are often put in multiple areas 
simultaneously. This fact could lead to an overestimation of the weight of individual subject areas. So 
we solved this issue by pooling these three subject areas for our analysis sample. 
13
 The bibliometric analysis ends  in April 2009 
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Source: authors’ calculations from ISI web of sciences. 
 In Figure 2, we assess what the governance issue represents within the total academic 
publication of the Bank. As in Figure 1, a double graduation is used on two different axes. On 
the left hand side, the number of total publications is considered, while on the right, we refer 
to the intra-organizational share of the governance theme. The scientific production of the 
Bank varies from 150 to 200 publications a year with a peak in 2001. Governance 
publications show an increasing trend, passing from a share of 1% or less from 1988 to 1992 
to about 8% over the period 2005-2008. 
 
Source: authors’ construction 
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Table 1 displays cumulative statistics dealing with governance over two decades (1988-2008) 
and three scientific domains. Influences are measured through the intra-organizational 
academic production (columns 3 and 4) and the worldwide publications (columns 5 and 6). 
Both the number of papers and enhanced associated citations are considered in absolute and 
relative terms, the second item in parentheses being interpreted as an impact factor.  
 For the World Bank, Economics, planning and development is by far the most important 
field of publication, totaling nearly 4,000 articles or papers over the period 1988-2008, four 
times more than the cumulative production of the other two reviewed fields. (On average, 
each of these publications has been cited more than 10 times. These scores represent 2.5% of 
the  total  publications  of  the  Bank and  3.2% of  the  citations. This is less than the numbers  
Table 1.  The World Bank and cumulative publications on governance (1988-2008) 
 
 
 
Subject areas 
 
Nature of 
Publications 
Total WB publications 
and governance share 
in parentheses (%) 
Worldwide publications on 
governance and 
the  WB’s share 
in parentheses (%) 
Number Citations Number Citations 
 
Economics, 
planning and 
development 
Articles and 
reviews 
2792 
(2.4) 
38562 
(1.9) 
2432 
(2.8) 
21452 
(3.4) 
Proceedings 
paper 
501 
(4.4) 
3465 
(3.1) 
725 
(3.04) 
4115 
(2.6) 
 
Total 
3912 
(2.4) 
42824 
(2) 
3723 
(2.5) 
25913 
(3.2) 
 
Business and  
finance 
Articles and 
reviews 
550 
(2.5) 
7982 
(4.6) 
706 
(2) 
10815 
(3.4) 
Proceedings 
paper 
132 
(6.8) 
1348 
(1.5) 
238 
(3.8) 
2715 
(0.7) 
 
Total 
766 
(3.2) 
9397 
(4.1) 
995 
(2.5) 
13606 
(2.8) 
 
Political Sciences 
and International 
Relations 
Articles and 
reviews 
294 
(1.4) 
1763 
(0.8) 
1690 
(0.2) 
8580 
(0.2) 
Proceedings 
paper 
39 
(2.5) 
207 
(0.5) 
323 
(0.3) 
1454 
(0.1) 
 
Total 
439 
(1.6) 
2042 
(0.8) 
2821 
(0.2) 
10199 
(0.2) 
Sources: authors’ compilations from ISI web of science 
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obtained for Business and finance: 3.3% and 4.1%, respectively, although percentages are 
close when market shares in worldwide publications and citations about governance are 
considered. Of the three scientific fields, only Political science and international relations 
proves to be a marginal area for the Bank. Several reasons can be put forward to explain this 
fact, including the belated interest for political issues due to the apolitical nature of the 
organization, in accordance with its founding Articles of Agreement. Focusing on the two first 
subject areas, the international market share of the Bank tends to be higher when the citations 
are considered, reflecting either the quality of the publications or the diffusion of the journals 
in which the research is published. 
 The methodology deployed for this empirical analysis has some obvious limits that have to  
be taken into account in interpreting the results. As already mentioned, the concept of 
governance is shared by multiple scientific disciplines making its delimitation difficult. In 
addition, some restrictive rules condition this exercise. A paper is considered to deal with 
“governance” when the term is explicitly used in the title, abstract or keywords. This 
convention results in an undervaluation of the publications of the 1980s, when the governance 
concept was conveyed by other expressions14. To avoid such a bias, the automatic research 
procedure has been complemented by manual mechanical counting in ten of the most 
important academic journals in economics, including those which are the main sources for the 
Bank’s authors publications. In doing so, attention has been paid to the theme itself, and not to 
a lexical list. These ten journals are : The American Economic Review, the Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, the Journal of Development Economics, World Development, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, The World Bank Economic Review, The Journal of 
African Economies, The Journal of Development Studies, The Journal of Comparative 
Economics and Economics of Transition.  
 Figure 3 has been elaborated according to the same principles used for Figure 2. The 
number of the Bank’s articles in the ten aforementioned journals and the relative contribution 
of the governance issue are given on the left and right axes, respectively. The dark curve 
reflects what these economic journals have represented for the total publications of the Bank. 
About 40 papers have been published annually in the ten journals over the period 1988-1994, 
                                                 
14
 For instance, the well-known 1989’s report of the World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to 
sustainable growth (World Bank, 1989) was its first report indexing explicitly the issue of governance 
as the key factor of weak economic performance in African countries while the French version of the 
report used the term “government” instead of “governance”. 
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against 50 per year from 1997 to 2005, and about 30 for the most recent years. Within this 
production, the governance issue rose steadily to a peak of 25% in 2003 and 2004. Then the 
share fell back to its 1995 level (10%). While the governance issue declined after the mid 
2000s, the contribution of what the selected journals have represented for the Bank also 
witnesses long term erosion. As the ten journals we refer to are among the most influential in 
the world, the evolution of the dark curve may suggest a significant loss of qualitative impact 
in the production of knowledge by the Bank. The contribution of the ten journals to the total 
publication of articles by the Bank falls from 35% in 1988 to about 15% in 2008.  
 
 
Source: authors’ construction 
 
 To summarize this section, academic publications and citations of papers play a significant 
role in the production of the “knowledge bank”, contributing to strengthen the soft power of 
the organization (to adopt Nye’s, 1990 expression). This soft power dimension is also present 
when the Bank sets up the dialogue with developing countries and the donor community in 
accordance with the CDF principles. Governments define their development strategy by 
promoting dialogue among stakeholders. The leadership of the Bank lies in its ability to 
communicate and persuade partners, to shape their preferences, and to lead them to 
acquiescence. Soft power in public aid allocation means the ability to convince the recipient 
that there is no doubt about what “good governance” principles are. Contrasting with this kind 
of influence is the Hard power which operates as an inducement, and sometimes as a threat; 
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similar to the IMF conditionality on loans and its catalytic role. The leadership of the Bank is 
therefore made up of a balance between soft and hard power, a subtle combination which 
leads to what some may refer to as smart power. The next section explores these powers by 
focusing on aid allocation policies. 
 
 
THE   BANK GOVERNANCE INDICATORS AND AID ALLOCATION POLICIES 
 
We briefly describe the WB’s governance indicators, and then investigate how these 
indicators correlate with aid commitments of the most important international donors, 
including the World Bank itself.15 
 
The governance indicators: CPIA, WGI and Doing Business 
 
The World Bank produces three main indicators dealing with governance. The oldest one is 
the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. Although the CPIA is not fully disclosed to 
external public, it is paradoxically recognized by some donors as the most influential of the 
WB’s indicators. This is especially true for commitments in favor of IDA eligible countries, 
but also for some other donors (Van Waeyenberge, 2009). At the end of the 1990s the socio-
political dimension of governance took an increasing importance in the World Bank’s agenda. 
The Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) resulted from this concern. This socio-political 
dimension was completed, in 2003, by the Doing Business indicators that depict to what 
extent the domestic economic and institutional climate supports private sector development16.  
 
  
                                                 
15
 In Assessing aid, which proved to be an influential publication of the Bank, governance was 
conceived as a crucial element of aid effectiveness, contributing to drive resource allocations (World 
Bank, 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000, Santiso, 2001). This perception was strongly debated in the 
literature as good governance can be endogenous to structural vulnerabilities (Guillaumont and 
Chauvet, 2001; Van Waeyenberge, 2009). Soft power provides information on the quality of 
governance while hard power potentially applies when aid disbursement is interrupted because of poor 
governance-based performance. See also Duffield (2002) for critics on the social dimensions of 
development and the use of aid in a context of global liberal governance. 
16
 This narrow list of the World Bank’s indicators could be extended with others benefiting from a 
more limited international statistical coverage. This is the case for the indicator of the Database on 
Political Institutions both conceived and followed by the World Bank’s research department since 
2000. The DPI explicitly deals with the nature of political regimes worldwide.  
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 The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
 
The CPIA, originally the Country Performance Rating (CPR) was established in 1977. It 
relies on an assessment process based on the Bank’s staff opinions.  Since 1998, two 
additional clusters have been added to the initial ones: the social inclusion dimension (cluster 
C) and the governance dimension (cluster D)17 (World Bank, 2010). The CPIA measures how 
the domestic policy and the institutional framework support sustainable growth and poverty 
reduction. Accordingly, this indicator reflects the role of the governance issue and conditions 
aid effectiveness.  By adding a social and political dimension to the CPIA, the World Bank 
joined the weave of the “augmented” Washington Consensus (Van Waeyenberge, 2009). 
   The CPIA is a key element in the International Development Association (IDA)- 
Performance-Based Allocation (PBA) system. This allocation takes into account several 
criteria including the size of the population, the Bank’s portfolio performance and the level of 
economic development of member countries. With the “IDA 16” replenishment process, the 
governance component accounts for 68% in the weighting pattern of the CPR18.  
The CPIA has some users outside the Bank, especially in regional multilateral banks (e.g. 
African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB)), which have adopted the same methodology, using sometimes 
the same denomination of items and marginally modifying either the definition, the 
components or the weighting pattern.    
 
  
                                                 
17
 The 4 clusters are: A. Economic Management (Macroeconomic Management, Fiscal Policy, Debt 
Policy); B. Structural Policies (Trade, Financial Sector, Business Regulatory Environment); C. 
Policies for Social Inclusion (Gender Equality, Equity of Public Resource Use, Building Human 
Resources, Social Protection and Labour, Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability); 
D. Public Sector Management and Institutions (Property Rights and Rule-based Governance, Quality 
of Budgetary and Financial Management, Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization, Quality of Public 
Administration, Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector). For each of the 
16 criteria, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high) 
18
 (i) Capped blend countries, whose allocations are capped at levels below what the PBA formula 
would allocate to them; (ii) post-conflict and reengaging countries, where IDA can provide special 
support for their recovery and development needs; (iii) arrears clearance operations; (iv) regional 
projects that play a key role in regional integration and/or regional public goods; and (v) exceptional 
allocations in the aftermath of natural disasters. These exceptions represent sometimes 1/3 of the IDA 
total resources (World Bank, 2010). 
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The Doing Business project database 
 
The Doing Business (DB) project was initially inspired by some studies conducted by de Soto 
in the Lima suburbs in the 1980s, but also by the World Economic Forum (WEF) through the 
Global Competitiveness Report. Influences between the Bank and the Forum are now much 
more mutual with clear interactions between the two institutions. Indeed, some information 
from DB is incorporated into the benchmarking procedure of the WEF for the measurement of 
international competitiveness. Laporta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV) have 
extended the pioneering empirical work through the IFC/World Bank team of the DB led by 
Djankov. The DB Project aims at reducing the burden of business regulatory rules, notably 
transaction costs, in order to enhance economic competitiveness of countries. The first edition 
of the report, launched in 2003, covered 5 indicators in 133 countries: Starting a business, 
Employing workers, Getting credit, Enforcing contracts, Closing a business. This list, which 
was enlarged in 2006, now contains 10 indicators, the 5 additional ones being: Dealing with 
construction permits, Registering property, Protecting investors, Paying taxes, Trading 
across borders. In the 2009 Bank report, a survey on the business regulatory environment was 
implemented allowing the assessment of the ability to reform through difficult times (World 
Bank, 2009). The data collection is made through readings of laws and regulations where the 
criteria are time, motion and cost indicators measuring efficiency in achieving a regulatory 
goal19. The DB database seems to impact donors’ aid allocation systems as demonstrated by 
the eligibility criteria to benefit the US Millennium Challenge Account (MCA).    
 
  
                                                 
19
 By soliciting legal practitioners or professionals who regularly undertake transactions, Doing 
Business Project differs from other business environment surveys. For instance, the Investment 
Climate Assessment (ICA), which is also a World Bank research program, refers to the feeling of 
private managers and then appears more sensitive to subjectivity than the Doing Business. Indeed, 
managers may reject the responsibility of the economic inefficiency to the external environment they 
have to assess. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.27 
 
19
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
 
The WGI, were launched in 1999 defining governance as the traditions and institutions by 
which authority is exercised in a country20. “Governance” is assessed for about 200 countries 
through six dimensions: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of 
Corruption (Kaufmann et al, 2008). The WGI have probably become the most important 
database dealing with the political dimension of governance.   The WGI are not considered as 
accomplished “state of art”, and the way they are constructed is periodically adjusted 
according to both internal and external thinking. This strategy illustrates the smart power of 
the Bank, where the willingness to take the lead on the definition of the indicators combines 
with openness to the participation of other donors in helping to shape a common knowledge 
on what good governance is.  
 
 The three governance indicators are all influential, but nevertheless criticized within both 
the academic sphere and the donor community.  One of the problems is that some components 
overlap. This can contribute to certain coherence but is also confusing. The CPIA is one of the 
multiple data sources of the WGI, but The Bank staff also refers to the WGI in the building 
process of the CPIA (Devarajan and Jonhson, 2008). In the same vein, the Doing Business 
indicators guide the assessment of regulations during the rating process of the CPIA (cluster 
B).21.  
 As with any approach resulting from expert judgment evaluations, the procedure 
underlying the construction of indicators also raises critical comments. Some authors 
emphasize the potential arbitrariness accompanying the data collection, the weighting pattern 
of components, or the insufficient theoretical foundations of the CPIA (Van Waeyenberge, 
2009; GTZ, 2008). In addition this indicator does not take into account the impact of 
structural vulnerability or the poverty of the human capital (Kanbur, 2005; Guillaumont 
2009). The WGI are criticized for the lack of theory underlying the six components, as well as 
                                                 
20
 This includes “the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity 
of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them;”.The initial 
team of the Governance Matters project was composed of Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton,   
Mastruzzi replacing Zoido-Lobaton after the first edition. 
 
21
 Arndt and Oman, 2006; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2010; Devarajan 
and Jonhson, 2008; Williams and Siddique, 2008, Langbein and Knack, 2010). 
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the tautology and weak discrimination of the governance aspects considered. As for the CPIA, 
the normative interpretation of components is not always clear, and all of them do not satisfy 
the orthogonality principle to provide a clear weighting pattern (Grindle, 2007; Andrews, 
2008). For instance, Langbein and Knack (2010) argue that the different components of the 
WGI are narrowly related and tend to deliver the same message by using different words. Last 
but not least, the Doing Business database has some weaknesses (Arrunada, 2007; World 
Bank, 2008). The liberal conception of the market economy goes hand-in-hand with the 
potential excess of “shortermism”, especially in the management of labour contracts22.  
 
 
The World Bank and the international donor community   
 
What influences do bilateral and multilateral donors recognize? 
 
With the fall of the Berlin wall, some bilateral donors including the United States, put 
pressure on the Bank for more active support for political governance reforms.  The bilateral 
delegation of powers to the Bank is associated with the so-called Buchanan‘s Samaritan 
Dilemma problem (1975)23. Some donor countries have the will to maintain financial 
assistance to low income countries, but don’t want to intervene themselves in those countries’ 
economic and political reform agendas. The multilateral framework looks more appropriate 
for this purpose. But other motivations have been the will to promote an efficient coordination 
among the donor community through the Special Partnership for Africa (SPA), and the 
willingness to let the Bank go ahead and show the way.  
 When examining the position of the main bilateral donors on the governance issue, some 
discrepancies arise on the conception and the operationalization of aid policies. France’s 
commitment to the new political governance paradigm goes back to the La Baule declaration, 
in 1990, and the France-Africa summit which was held in Ouagadougou, in 1996. The 
specific theme of this summit was: “good governance and development”. Ten years later, 
governance criteria had entered somewhat in the aid allocation system. Traditional 
                                                 
22
 Indeed, among the most regular critics running counter Doing Business data, one could notify the 
bias in favor of formal and urban sectors, the oversight of recurrent transaction costs compared to 
initial costs, then the weakness in taking into account the substitution effect between present and 
future and the lack of distinction between deliberate procedure and restricting procedures (Arrunada, 
2007). 
23
 James M. Buchanan, “The Samaritan’s Dilemma.” in Edmund Prelim, ed., Altruism, Morality and 
Economic Theory (New York: Russell Sage, 1975), pp. 71-85.  
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.27 
 
21
geographical distribution of France’s financial flows are affected by an historical “path 
dependency” which proves to be a source of allocative inertia. Because of its former colonial 
power and its deep implications in the design of present cooperation, France faces difficulties 
in promoting a policy of rewarding good governance. However, in 2006, the French Ministry 
of economy joined the club of governance indicator producers, elaborating “institutional 
profiles” with the ambition of highlighting the main institutional factors that determine the 
economic take-off of successful countries. To refer to concepts we defined earlier, these 
profiles relate more to soft power (carrots) than hard power (stick). Part of the information 
produced by these profiles has recently been incorporated into the WGI. This incorporation 
can itself be interpreted as an expression of the Bank’s smart power to develop attractiveness 
and stimulate appropriateness of its governance paradigm.   
 The United Kingdom’s approach to governance differs somewhat from the French vision, 
as it relies on the development of a participatory-based assessment procedure. In other words, 
the assessment is jointly made with recipient countries. Through Drivers of Change (DOC) 
developed by DFID since 2003, governance starts with a political economy analysis which is 
quite comparable to the diagnostic surveys that the Bank implements on governance and anti-
corruption (GAC). Thus, the diagnostic of governance through a participatory process 
potentially increases the willingness to implement solutions (Chhotray and Hulme, 2009). Such 
an approach contrasts with that of the aggregate indicator where foreign aid is allocated across 
countries according to their international ranking. Beyond the DOC, aid allocation by the UK 
is also influenced by the Bank’s CPIA rating system. This is especially true for fragile states 
where the governance issue is challenging because of overlapping exogenous constraints and 
endogenous political behavior24 (DFID, 2005). 
The relationship between the USA and the World Bank reflects the complexity of the 
analysis when examining “soft” and “hard” powers of the organization. Some authors have 
talked about a hegemonic influence of USA on the way the World Bank perceives the 
governance issue (Wade, 2001, 2002; Stein, 2008, Weaver, 2008; Mikesell, 2001). But 
reciprocal influences do exist. Among the three channels of US aid only one seems to have 
been under the influence of the Bank’s governance indicators. Indeed, six of the sixteen 
criteria underlying the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) system are totally based on the 
World Bank governance indicators. Five come from the WGI and one from the Doing 
                                                 
24
 Yet, that leads to differences with the World Bank categorization of LICUS (Low Income Countries 
Under Stress) and has to face critics estimating that fragile states are defined following fragile criteria. 
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Business project. While U.S Department of State funds are allocated according to strategic 
considerations, US-AID does not explicitly integrate governance criteria in its allocation 
formula, although this agency has undertaken governance assessments. Rather than social 
aspects, economic effectiveness and political considerations prevail in the design of the US 
governance agenda (Chhotray & Hume, 2009).  
 The Japanese attitude is quite similar to the US position. Most scholars have shown that 
Japanese aid behavior is significantly influenced by the US aid system (Katada, 1997). Four 
different ministries participate in aid allocation, each of them pursuing different motives. 
Strategic considerations predominate in Latin America and Asia, the same main geographical 
areas as the USA. Accordingly, Japanese aid allocation is not explicitly based on “good” 
governance criteria, although some financing may be dedicated to governance related sectors, 
especially in Africa and Asia. By its multilateral aid contributions, Japan collaborates with the 
World Bank Institute, but also with the United Nations through the United Nations 
Democracy Fund.  
 With respect to our theme, the case of Nordic European countries is also interesting. Some 
authors consider that they are particularly sensitive to the “Samaritan Dilemma” (Hagen, 
2006; Epstein and Gang, 2009). These countries delegate the management of significant parts 
of their aid to multilateral organizations, mainly the World Bank. In addition, as they are 
sensitive to question about governance, when providing non-delegated budget support, they 
prove to be influenced by the CPIA ratings. To a certain extent this behavior is also reflected 
in the behavior of the Dutch government (see Table 2).   
 Through the governance network (GovNet), the OECD-Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) provides an opportunity for bilateral and multilateral donors to compare, 
discuss and coordinate views on governance in accordance with the Paris declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda. On this specific issue, the 2009 OECD report gives the 
flavor and summarizes the different donor approaches (OECD, 2009).  
 Table 2 shows how donor governance assessments vary across countries and organizations. 
Some donors use one or more indicators, while others prefer the establishment of profiles; 
some incorporate quantitative indicators, while others refer to qualitative ones; some 
assessments are exclusively based on economic indicators, while others incorporate political 
economy judgments or measurements (OECD, 2009). The Bank’s influence conveyed by 
indicators is indicated in the last column on the right.  
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 Through the European Development Fund (EDF), the European Commission (EC), which 
is the largest worldwide grant provider, included “good” governance as an essential element 
of the Cotonou Agreement. In the preamble of this 2000 document, the parties acknowledge 
the critical importance of a political environment that is conducive to development, as well as 
the primary responsibility of the ACP countries for creating such an environment. This 
Table 2. The World Bank and governance assessments by some bilateral and multilateral 
partners 
 
Partners 
 
Assessment tool denomination 
 
Data 
type 
Governance 
aspect 
Involvement of 
the recipient 
country 
Influence of 
the World 
Bank 
indicator 
                                                                                      Multilateral Organizations 
AfDB 
Country Governance Profile (P) QL E NS WGI 
CPIA (I) QT E NS CPIA 
AsDB 
CPIA (I) QT E NS CPIA 
Governance Risk Assessment and Risk 
management (I) 
QL E S - 
EC-EDF Governance profiles (P) QT-QL E NS WGI 
IaDB 
Country Institutional and Policy 
Evaluation-CIPE – (I) 
QT E NS CPIA 
Democratic Governance and 
Institutional Assessment (P) 
QT-QL P-E S - 
Bilateral Donors 
France Institutional profiles (I) QT E NS WGI 
Germany 
Catalogue of criteria: assessing 
development orientation (I) 
QL E NS CPIA, WGI 
Netherlands 
Strategic governance and corruption 
analysis (P) 
QL P-E NS CPIA 
Stability Assessment Framework (P) QL P-E NS - 
United 
Kingdom 
Country Governance Assessment (I) QT-QL E NS WGI 
Drivers of change (P) QL P-E S - 
Strategic Conflict Assessment (I) QL P-E NS CPIA 
United States 
of America 
MCA (I) QT E NS WGI, DB 
USAID-Democracy and Governance 
Strategic Assessment Framework (P) 
QL P-E NS WGI 
Note :  I = indicator and P = profile. For the row data type: QL = qualitative and QT = quantitative. For the row Governance 
aspect: E = economic and P-E = political economy. For the row host country involvement: S = significant participation and 
NS = non significant participation. DB = doing business. EC-EDF = European Commission/European Development Fund; 
AfDB = African Development Bank; AsDB = Asian Development Bank; IaDB = Inter-American Development Bank. 
Sources : From OECD (2009) and authors’compilations, various national documents 
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explains why ACP-EU cooperation is underpinned by a basic set of political principles and 
values that each of the parties is supposed to respect. The rules of the game include three 
“essential” elements (i.e., respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law) 
and one “fundamental” element (i.e. good governance). The violation of these principles may 
lead to partial or complete suspension of development cooperation. In 2006, the Thematic 
Evaluation of the EC support to Good Governance (EC, 2006) and later on the ACP 
governance profiles re-stated the EC interest for this subject. The World Bank exerts a notable 
influence on the EC governance profiles, notably through its WGI which are considered along 
with three other clusters. These clusters take into account the social aspect of governance, the 
regional and international context, and the quality of the partnership. The Bank also 
influences regional multilateral banks, mainly through the CPIA as these organizations may 
be reluctant to consider the political dimension of member states.  
 
Beyond rhetoric: what do correlations suggest? 
 
 A deep analysis addressing the orientation of the causality between donors’ aid allocations 
and WB governance indicators is beyond the scope of this sub-section. Our ambition here is 
limited to shedding light on potential linear correlations. Annual new aid commitments as 
published by DAC/OECD are the left hand side variable of the regression model we run. 
Commitments are preferred to disbursements, which are more likely to be determined by the 
nature of projects (e.g. the difficulty of stopping a multi-annual project because of “bad” 
governance). 
  Cross-sectional estimations are run, the number of observations being determined by the 
availability of data for the three WB indicators. The first official disclosure of the CPIA dates 
back to 2005. Average values over the period 2005-2008 are considered for all the variables 
to smooth the short time series. On the left side of table 3, donor-based correlation models are 
presented. We begin with a basic empirical model reflecting the WB’s Performance-Based 
Allocation system (PBA) from which we drop out any influence of governance indicators25. 
Aid is assumed to be linked to the same allocation model, with population and the per capita 
Gross National Income as determinants. The square of these variables is also considered, to 
control for non-linearity of relationships. The potential financial risks, or the country portfolio 
                                                 
25
   Denmark and Japan have been considered in table 3 while these countries are outside the OECD 
source we used to build table 2. On the contrary, the Inter-American Development Bank is absent from 
table 3 for statistical reasons -information about new commitments over the period 2005-2008 is not 
available for this regional Bank.   
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performance, are proxied by the external debt service ratio. For France and the United 
Kingdom, a dummy variable has also been introduced reflecting historical relations with 
former colonial territories (see Alesina and Dollar, 2000). For each donor, the common basic 
econometric model (BM) highlights the goodness of fit (e.g. coefficient of determination). By 
using nested hypotheses, the model is then augmented to see how new commitments during 
the period correlate with the WB’s indicators. The CPIA is embedded first to the basic model 
(BM), and then, the six components of the WGI and finally, the Doing Business rankings. 
Adjusted coefficients of determination (R²adj) and partial F-tests indicate the statistical 
contribution of additional variables to the explanation of the variance of aid allocation.   
 
Table 3.   World Bank governance indicators and aid allocation (2005-2008) 
Notes: For each of the donor-based correlation models, the log of average ODA commitments over the period 2005-08 are considered on the 
left hand side. In the basic model we account for: GNI per capita and the square of this variable, population and its square, and external debt 
service. For France and the UK a dummy variable is also introduced () reflecting past colonial status. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Aid 
data come from OECD/DAC online database while governance and the other variables are provided by the World Bank’s WDI, 2009. 
 
 The basic model suggests a level of correlation with aid commitments varying from 19% 
(Netherlands) to 70% (Germany) over the period 2005-2008. The introduction of 
the CPIA significantly increases these correlations, especially for the World Bank (IDA), and 
to a lesser extent for the regional multilateral development banks (AfDB, AsDB). Although 
the role of the CPIA varies a lot across bilateral donors, diversity seems to prevail in 
accordance with what official policies tell us (table 2). This indicator is influential for the 
 
     Basic econometric model (BM) 
       Without WB’s governance indicators 
World Bank governance indicators 
 
BM + CPIA 
 
BM + CPIA +  WGI 
 
 
BM + CPIA+   
WGI + DB 
 
Donors 
Number of 
Countries 
 
R² adj 
 
F-test 
 
R² adj 
Partial 
F-test 
 
R² adj 
Partial F-
test 
 
R² adj 
Partial 
F-test 
IDA (WB) 70 0.45 21.7*** 0.72 57.5*** 0.75 2.4** 0.75 0.8 
AfDB 31 0.63 43.5*** 0.82 15.8*** 0.81 1.3 0.80 0.3 
AsDB 17 0.61 11.7*** 0.68 5.7** 0.64 3.5 0.69 1.9 
EDF (EC) 68 0.55 28.4*** 0.55 1.5 0.58 3.9*** 0.59 4.1** 
Denmark 45 0.21 5.2*** 0.23 3.0* 0.22 0.9 0.22 1.0 
France 64 0.58 18.2*** 0.57 0.1 0.55 1.1 0.56 1.3 
Germany 67 0.70 74.8*** 0.72 5.0** 0.74 2.2* 0.73 0.2 
Japan 65 0.61 26.3*** 0.67 18.1*** 0.69 2.9** 0.69 5.6** 
Netherlands 56 0.19 6.6*** 0.28 6.5** 0.35 4.0*** 0.35 4.0* 
United 
Kingdom 
 
62 0.69 35.3*** 0.71 3.3* 0.69 0.6 0.71 5.1** 
United States of 
America 
 
67 0.59 28.8*** 0.60 3.0* 0.61 1.7 0.61 0.2 
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Netherlands (+7 percentage points) and Japan (+ 6) while its impact proves marginal for other 
donors including the European Commission. For the United Kingdom and France, the past 
colonial history has been introduced in the regression under the form of a dummy variable for 
countries having the status of a former colony. For France, this dummy variable gives more 
information on the rules for aid allocation than any other structural determinant or governance 
indicator. In other words, with this specification, the adjusted coefficient of determination 
(R²adj) rises from 18% to 58%. To a lesser extent this finding also applies to the UK (from 
055% to 69%). France is characterized by a strong “path dependency”, its assistance being 
concentrated on its priority solidarity zone (ZSP). This zone overlaps with Sub-Saharan 
African countries whose structural vulnerability negatively affects the quality of the public 
management. Accordingly, although France is engaged in the promotion of “good 
governance”, the relation between aid commitments and WB indicators proves weaker than 
for other bilateral donors.  
 Do the WGI or Doing Business provide additional information about aid allocation rules? 
The World Bank’s aid proves sensitive to the WGI, as is that of the European Commission 
and the Netherlands, but regional multilateral bank aid is not. In the case of AfDB or AsDB, 
member countries are also shareholders of these organizations. This institutional situation 
may introduce acute difficulties in the assessment of the political context, especially for 
Africa, as the rules of liberal democracy still remain to be settled. Last but not least, the Doing 
Business indicators are correlated to aid commitments only for the AsDB.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The World Bank’s model of “good” governance has been developed over several decades 
since the end of the 1970s. The normative concept comes from the liberal philosophical 
tradition, combining the protection of private property, the consent of the governed, and the 
prevalence of legislative power rather than autocratic forms of rule. The present state of art 
can be seen as inherited from the age of Enlightenment, but in the eighteenth century, the 
political dimension had an importance which entered belatedly into the Bank’s concept, for 
historical reasons. In shaping what good governance means, the organization has had to 
comply with its founding Articles of Agreement as well as some ideological barriers. With the 
fall of communism some authors thought that universal values of liberalism would spread 
worldwide, allowing the unity of both political and economic governance aspects in 
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accordance with some liberal philosophers such as Rawls or Dworkin. A long term evolution 
covering three decades underlies the governance indicators that have been elaborated within 
the Bank. These indicators focused first on economic aspects (CPIA, Doing Business), and 
later embraced the political (WGI) dimension of the social liberal contract.  
 In the design and the worldwide spread of what might be understood as good governance, 
the Bank and the academic spheres geographically close to its headquarters played a 
significant role, especially but not exclusively, through publications. This article has made a 
census of the Bank’s publications by using the Web of Science bibliographic database from 
the ISI Web of Knowledge website. The worldwide publications on governance have 
dramatically and steadily increased to reach 800 in 2008. Within this production, the Bank’s 
share has varied from less than 1% to more than 3%. Within the knowledge production of the 
Bank, publications on governance have represented an annual maximum of 8% over the 
period 2005-08, but with a peak of 25% in 2003-04. This was calculated using a manual 
counting procedure from ten academic economics journals among the most important 
worldwide. So the Bank’s message on governance circulated in academia, suggesting a 
deliberate search for a qualitative effect, using knowledge production as an effective channel 
to strengthen the influence of the organization.  
 As well as publications, training and learning activities were also important, as were the 
elaboration and calculation of the governance indicators we referred to. In shaping the 
concept of “good” governance, the Bank combined both soft and hard power. Soft power 
comes from the Bank’s ability to develop the attractiveness of liberal society values and its 
concomitant welfare implications; to keep developing countries open to the process of 
integration into the world economy; and to promote poverty reduction strategies as a top 
priority. The Bank’s soft power is required to manage the diversity of the world; to keep 
partners on board; and to maintain relationships with all the stakeholders including NGOs, 
and international civil society at large. But hard power also matters through the performance-
based financial system which links aid to the “good” governance objectives as measured, by 
the CPIA or the WGI.  The relationship between the three WB indicators and the new 
commitments of some of the most important donors has been tested on donor-based cross-
sectional relationships for the period 2005-2008. The statistical framework does not allow a 
rigorous conclusion in terms of causal inference. However, most of the regressions we run did 
not reject significant correlations, in accordance with what donors recognize, including when 
the regression model controls for a vector of structural determinants of aid allocation.  
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 The CPIA proves to be closely correlated with aid from both the Bank and the regional 
multilateral banks, while the political dimension of governance prevails for the European 
Commission. Former colonial countries such as France, and to a lesser extent the UK, seem to 
pay less attention to the governance issue. Some geostrategic reasons surely underlie their 
behavior, as well as the fact that governance is not independent of the sources of structural 
vulnerability which go hand-in-hand with poverty in former sub-Saharan African colonies.  
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Notes: For each of the donor-based correlation models, the log of average ODA commitments over the period 2005- 08 are considered on the left hand side. In the basic model we account for: GNI per capita and the square of this 
variable, population and its square, and external debt service. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Aid data, from OECD/DAC online database while governance and the other variables are provided by the World Bank’s WDI, 2009.. 
Annex 1. World Bank Governance indicators and some multilateral aid allocations system (average commitments over the period 2005-2008) 
  (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
VARIABLES IDA IDA IDA IDA EC EC EC EC AFDB AFDB AFDB AFDB ASDB ASDB ASDB ASDB 
Basic econometric model               
GNI pc -0.104 1.527 -0.210 -0.355 
-
4.750*** 
-
4.514*** 
-
5.249*** -5.177*** -0.0979 -0.560 -1.210 -1.282 25.10** 35.54*** 62.47** 75.41** 
  
(2.521) (2.153) (2.144) (2.196) (1.049) (1.046) (1.158) (1.127) (1.796) (1.385) (1.746) (1.786) (8.359) (8.277) (14.57) (17.56) 
GNI pc^2 0.0948 -0.0956 0.0463 0.0526 0.374*** 0.349*** 0.413*** 0.416*** 0.0617 0.0621 0.125 0.131 -1.899** 
-
2.745*** -4.739** -5.733** 
  
(0.183) (0.163) (0.164) (0.167) (0.0861) (0.0866) (0.0934) (0.0898) (0.157) (0.121) (0.145) (0.147) (0.641) (0.642) (1.067) (1.312) 
POP 0.966*** 0.681*** 1.076*** 1.079*** 0.745*** 0.710*** 0.857*** 0.867*** 1.022*** 0.926*** 0.907*** 0.926*** -0.0559 -0.303 0.879 0.568 
  
(0.301) (0.199) (0.208) (0.219) (0.141) (0.147) (0.153) (0.146) (0.279) (0.248) (0.290) (0.309) (0.466) (0.447) (0.932) (0.903) 
POP^2 0.012 0.018 -0.029 -0.029 
-
0.044*** 
-
0.043*** 
-
0.053*** -0.054*** 0.0040 -0.046 -0.042 -0.046 0.124* 0.115* 0.040 0.069 
  
(0.0380) (0.0399) (0.0515) (0.0512) (0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0179) (0.0153) (0.0585) (0.0505) (0.0529) (0.0569) (0.0631) (0.0555) (0.0856) (0.0805) 
DEBT Service -0.136 -0.0670 -0.0719 -0.0520 -0.139 -0.131 -0.198* -0.231** -0.370** -0.115 -0.184 -0.188 -0.0776 0.113 -0.196 -0.144 
  (0.309) (0.174) (0.150) (0.156) (0.125) (0.124) (0.100) (0.106) (0.162) (0.104) (0.117) (0.113) (0.318) (0.364) (0.581) (0.510) 
World Bank governance indicators               
CPIA   2.408*** 1.629*** 1.557***   0.230 0.0119 0.109   1.162*** 1.289** 1.248**   1.790** 4.513* 5.261 
  
  (0.317) (0.482) (0.497)   (0.188) (0.413) (0.413)   (0.291) (0.570) (0.559)   (0.749) (2.049) (3.103) 
WGI_Corruption     -0.511 -0.336     0.114 -0.136     -1.032* -0.926     3.894 3.394 
  
    (0.506) (0.492)     (0.261) (0.257)     (0.526) (0.610)     (2.412) (2.796) 
WGI_Government     0.480 0.388     -0.115 0.0137     0.376 0.348     -8.703 -9.618 
  
    (0.871) (0.857)     (0.579) (0.584)     (0.543) (0.570)     (6.007) (6.884) 
WGI_Stability     0.347 0.405     -0.00848 -0.0859     -0.00983 0.0102     0.336 0.173 
  
    (0.333) (0.325)     (0.170) (0.172)     (0.195) (0.211)     (0.529) (0.539) 
WGI_Law     0.399 0.254     -0.450 -0.257     0.605 0.524     1.185 2.008 
  
    (0.549) (0.549)     (0.280) (0.241)     (0.606) (0.662)     (0.968) (0.905) 
WGI_Regulatory     -0.436 -0.440     0.0738 0.0785     0.0577 0.0322     0.0705 0.297 
  
    (0.480) (0.474)     (0.432) (0.438)     (0.607) (0.602)     (1.778) (1.445) 
WGI_Voice     0.720** 0.696**     0.686*** 0.726***     -0.350 -0.351     0.434 0.793 
  
    (0.320) (0.317)     (0.183) (0.178)     (0.223) (0.235)     (0.524) (0.727) 
DB rank       -0.00418       0.00574**       -0.00184       0.0126 
        (0.00472)       (0.00284)       (0.00341)       (0.00910) 
Observations 71 71 70 70 69 69 68 68 31 31 31 31 18 18 17 17 
Adj R-squared 0.453 0.723 0.751 0.750 0.553 0.554 0.581 0.596 0.637 0.820 0.810 0.801 0.619 0.686 0.645 0.696 
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Annex 2.  World Bank Governance indicators and some bilateral aid allocation system (average commitments over the period 2005-2008) 
  (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) 
Basic model JAPAN JAPAN JAPAN JAPAN USA USA USA USA UK UK UK UK FRANCE FRANCE FRANCE FRANCE 
GNI pc 2.16 3.00* 1.69 1.87 -3.17 -2.63 -2.54 -2.57 -5.81*** -5.47*** -6.13*** -6.77*** -2.65 -2.59 -2.85 -2.51 
  (1.64) (1.58) (1.43) (1.33) (1.96) (1.81) (1.80) (1.85) (1.82) (1.81) (2.09) (2.05) (2.23) (2.25) (2.26) (2.21) 
GNI pc^2 -0.141 -0.231* -0.122 -0.153 0.295* 0.238 0.236 0.234 0.45*** 0.41*** 0.466** 0.501*** 0.218 0.211 0.239 0.225 
  (0.133) (0.128) (0.117) (0.109) (0.161) (0.149) (0.147) (0.153) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.184) (0.189) (0.183) 
POP 0.427** 0.306* 0.491*** 0.469** 1.252*** 1.171*** 1.07*** 1.073*** 0.94*** 0.88*** 0.81** 0.90*** 0.29 0.277 0.338 0.392 
  (0.177) (0.156) (0.182) (0.179) (0.192) (0.185) (0.210) (0.213) (0.278) (0.263) (0.326) (0.313) (0.203) (0.198) (0.257) (0.240) 
POP^2 0.0515** 0.0568** 0.0320 0.0241 -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06* -0.06* 0.007 0.007 0.02 0.014 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.03) (0.034) (0.025) (0.024) (0.03) (0.0350) (0.037) (0.039) (0.043) (0.0396) (0.0312) (0.0316) (0.0437) (0.0421) 
DEBT Service 0.056 0.084 0.14 0.18 -0.175 -0.155 -0.30* -0.29* -0.12 -0.104 -0.143 -0.0784 0.219 0.225 0.224 0.171 
 (0.161) (0.131) (0.137) (0.147) (0.173) (0.159) (0.159) (0.169) (0.201) (0.185) (0.177) (0.165) (0.164) (0.158) (0.158) (0.191) 
Colon_british                 1.57*** 1.60*** 1.68*** 1.49***         
                  (0.302) (0.297) (0.324) (0.342)         
Colon_french                         2.21*** 2.23*** 2.062*** 1.800*** 
                          (0.282) (0.29) (0.347) (0.410) 
World Bank governance indicators               
CPIA   0.831*** 0.729 0.565   0.538* 1.05 1.012   0.532* 0.673 0.235   0.0840 0.313 0.310 
    (0.195) (0.499) (0.516)   (0.310) (0.668) (0.688)   (0.293) (0.686) (0.725)   (0.231) (0.560) (0.570) 
WGI_Corruption     -0.61* -0.277     -0.99** -0.881*     -0.49 0.053     0.350 0.119 
      (0.341) (0.36)     (0.497) (0.491)     (1.222) (1.220)     (0.827) (0.844) 
WGI_Government     -0.107 -0.288     0.674 0.612     0.563 0.560     -1.77* -1.795* 
      (0.691) (0.696)     (0.946) (0.950)     (1.088) (0.987)     (0.982) (0.970) 
WGI_Stability     0.347 0.416     -0.49** -0.454**     0.275 0.383     0.065 0.0542 
      (0.289) (0.275)     (0.225) (0.223)     (0.310) (0.282)     (0.250) (0.260) 
WGI_Law     0.887 0.720     -0.078 -0.166     -0.805 -1.239     0.264 0.422 
      (0.662) (0.639)     (0.465) (0.474)     (1.098) (1.050)     (0.841) (0.840) 
WGI_Regulatory     -0.324 -0.310     -0.512 -0.515     0.0733 0.102     0.575 0.784 
      (0.489) (0.502)     (0.566) (0.572)     (0.733) (0.728)     (0.558) (0.573) 
WGI_Voice     -0.237 -0.315     0.514 0.496     -0.0272 0.0117     0.216 0.214 
      (0.248) (0.244)     (0.319) (0.308)     (0.377) (0.368)     (0.271) (0.274) 
DB rank       -0.008**       -0.002       -0.01**       0.006 
        (0.003)       (0.005)       (0.004)       (0.005) 
Observations 67 67 66 65 68 68 67 67 62 62 62 62 65 65 64 64 
Adj R-squared 0.610 0.671 0.696 0.699 0.590 0.605 0.617 0.612 0.696 0.710 0.698 0.718 0.584 0.577 0.558 0.562 
                
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.27 
 
34
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: For each of the donor-based correlation models, the log of average ODA commitments over the period 2005- 08 are considered on the left hand side. In the basic model we account for: GNI per capita and the 
square of this variable, population and its square, and external debt service. For France and the UK a dummy variable is also introduced () reflecting the colonial status. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Aid data come 
from OECD/DAC online database while governance and the other variables are provided by the World Bank’s WDI, 2009.. 
 
Annex 2 (continued).  World Bank Governance indicators and some bilateral aid allocation system (average commitments over the period 2005-2008) 
 
 
(34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) 
VARIABLES Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Germany Germany Germany Germany 
Basic econometric model            
GNI pc -5.888* -4.990 -5.730* -5.917* 5.378* 5.241 2.475 2.999 -0.874 -0.351 -1.705 -1.705 
  
(3.231) (3.091) (3.134) (3.059) (3.055) (3.213) (3.381) (3.422) (1.733) (1.708) (1.639) (1.684) 
GNI pc^2 0.501* 0.400 0.465* 0.466* -0.394 -0.403 -0.176 -0.212 0.101 0.0447 0.165 0.163 
  
(0.276) (0.266) (0.259) (0.251) (0.254) (0.271) (0.285) (0.287) (0.143) (0.142) (0.139) (0.141) 
POP 1.043** 1.040** 1.721*** 1.630*** 0.785*** 0.646** 1.207*** 1.163*** 0.947*** 0.866*** 0.835*** 0.832*** 
  
(0.430) (0.394) (0.453) (0.507) (0.276) (0.312) (0.380) (0.383) (0.238) (0.228) (0.261) (0.266) 
POP^2 -0.0414 -0.0611 -0.138 -0.121 -0.0251 -0.0198 -0.0859 -0.0891 -0.0368 -0.0337 -0.00865 -0.00835 
  
(0.0736) (0.0698) (0.0836) (0.0832) (0.0286) (0.0340) (0.0537) (0.0532) (0.0275) (0.0257) (0.0316) (0.0325) 
DEBT Service -0.257 -0.189 -0.147 -0.106 -0.364* -0.284 -0.283 -0.275 0.00699 0.0283 -0.0693 -0.0588 
 
(0.276) (0.234) (0.222) (0.214) (0.189) (0.206) (0.245) (0.249) (0.184) (0.153) (0.159) (0.158) 
World Bank governance indicators           
CPIA  1.052** 0.175 -0.123  0.553* -0.0369 0.186  0.531** 1.155** 1.123** 
  
 (0.414) (0.810) (0.728)  (0.319) (0.836) (0.892)  (0.237) (0.535) (0.533) 
WGI_Corruption   2.020** 2.692***   -0.437 -0.916   -0.836 -0.744 
  
  (0.961) (0.968)   (0.990) (1.014)   (0.727) (0.731) 
WGI_Government   -0.480 -0.857   -0.317 0.0146   -0.490 -0.518 
  
  (1.185) (1.182)   (1.254) (1.261)   (0.667) (0.668) 
WGI_Stability   0.307 0.487   0.394 0.278   0.275 0.297 
  
  (0.321) (0.326)   (0.352) (0.367)   (0.237) (0.236) 
WGI_Law   -0.463 -0.991   1.004 1.315   -0.0913 -0.170 
  
  (1.299) (1.263)   (0.941) (0.959)   (0.649) (0.632) 
WGI_Regulatory   -0.307 -0.305   -0.0745 -0.128   -0.168 -0.162 
  
  (0.882) (0.843)   (0.999) (0.984)   (0.505) (0.502) 
WGI_Voice   0.689** 0.748**   0.310 0.245   0.126 0.115 
  
  (0.328) (0.316)   (0.534) (0.551)   (0.194) (0.197) 
DB rank    -0.0109*    0.00721    -0.00163 
  
   (0.00546)    (0.00713)    (0.00349) 
Observations 57 57 57 56 45 45 45 45 67 67 67 67 
Adj R-squared 0.190 0.280 0.359 0.355 0.212 0.234 0.226 0.227 0.706 0.725 0.742 0.738 
